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Scharffs: Literature Movement

HOW THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF VIOLENCE AND THE WORD
KILLED THE LAW AS LITERATURE MOVEMENT
Brett G. Scharffs*
I.
Since this conference focuses on the work of a particular
individual, Robert Cover, I hope you will not mind a personal detour
as I explain how and why Robert Cover’s work has had such an
outsized impact on me. The title of my remarks, “How the First
Paragraph of Violence and the Word Killed the Law as Literature
Movement” is deliberately provocative, invoking the violence that
Cover spoke of in Violence and the Word.1
I arrived at Yale Law School in 1989, with a newly minted
philosophy degree from Oxford University, where my thesis focused
on the uses of literary theory in the interpretation of legal texts. In
particular, my thesis was an analysis of a spirited, even vituperative,
debate that was taking place in law reviews between Stanley Fish,
and three philosophically sophisticated lawyers, Owen Fiss, 2 Richard
Posner,3 and Ronald Dworkin.4 For all their differences, each of
*

Rex E. Lee Chair and Professor of Law; Director, International Center for Law
and Religion Studies; J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
Heartfelt thanks to Professor Samuel J. Levine, his colleagues at Touro Law
Center, and the Jewish Law Institute for giving me the opportunity to participate in
this conference, and for giving me an incentive to revisit a scholar and topic that
has been critically important in my intellectual development and to how I
understand the law. Thanks also to everyone who participated in the conference.
1
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-29 (1986).
2
For the exchange between Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish, see Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 739, 739-63 (1982); Stanley
Fish, Fiss v. Fish, 36 STANFORD L. REV. 1325, 1325-47 (1984); Owen M. Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 177, 177-97 (1985).
3
For the exchange between Richard Posner and Stanley Fish, see Richard Posner,
Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1351, 1351-92
(1986); Stanley Fish, Don’t Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law
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these three professors were under assault by Fish for their belief that
texts could communicate stable and predictable meaning. My thesis
was that Professor Fish’s arguments fell short because they were
based, in each instance, on a severe misconstruction of what
Professors Fiss, Posner and Dworkin were saying.5
Nonetheless, I arrived at Yale Law School, it is fair to say, in
the grip of what Martha Minow and others have called the
“interpretive turn,” in legal analysis—the belief that literary theory
had important and meaningful contributions to make to the
interpretation of legal texts.6
But my understanding of the
differences between interpreting literature and interpreting law was
forever changed when I encountered Robert Cover’s work.7 I was
sufficiently impressed that together with a group of other Yale Law
students , we organized a reading group on Robert Cover’s work,
which was student-led and (in a practice that is one of the reasons I
have abiding affection for Yale Law School) approved for pass/fail
credit by the School’s curriculum committee. His masterwork,

and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 777-93 (1988); Richard Posner, Interpreting
Law, Interpreting Literature, 7 RARITAN 1, 1-31 (1988).
4
For the exchange between Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish, see Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 249, 249-70
(W.J.T. Mitchell ed., Chicago Univ. Press 1983); Stanley Fish, Working on the
Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, in THE POLITICS
OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 271, 271-86; Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley
Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk About Objectivity Any More,
in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 287, 287-313; Stanley Fish, Wrong
Again, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 299, 299-316 (1983); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
(Harv. Univ. Press 1986); Stanley Fish, Still Wrong After All These Years, in LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY 401, 401-18 (D. Reidel Publ’g Co. 1987).
5
Brett G. Scharffs, Interpretation and Adjudication: Some Philosophical Aspects of
a Current Debate (1989) (B.A. thesis, Oxford University) (on file with author).
6
See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1860-1915 (1987).
7
Others have noted a similar impact of Cover’s Work. See, e.g., id. In this essay,
written shortly after Cover’s article was published, Minow states: “Cover raised a
warning that should chill those of us who are taken with the interpretive turn in
law.” Id. at 1893. Minow adds: “Cover’s challenge alters the terms of the debate
and for someone, like me, who is drawn to the interpretive turn, his challenge
forces reconsideration and reevaluation.” Id. at 1894. Minow also states: “Cover’s
work changes the terms of discussion; we cannot go on the way we were going
after we hear his words.” Id. at 1863.
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Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process,8 his articles
Nomos and Narrative9 and The Folktales of Justice,10 as well as some
of his lesser-known work, had a tremendous impact on my way of
thinking about the law. But nothing had a greater effect than
Violence and the Word, which was published in 1986 shortly after
Professor Cover’s death and just a few years before I arrived at
Yale.11
It is fair to say this article landed like a bombshell on my way
of thinking about the law and about the interpretive enterprise.
Violence and the Word begins with what, to my mind, is one of the
most important and powerful sentences in legal scholarship. Cover
declares, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and
death.”12
In a footnote, he explains that the term “legal interpretation”
is “directed principally to the interpretive acts of judges.”13 But he
uses the broader term “legal interpretation,” he says, “for it is my
position that the violence which judges deploy as instruments of a
modern nation-state necessarily engages anyone who interprets the
law in a course of conduct that entails either the perpetration or the
suffering of this violence.”14
The implications of this declaration are stunning, shocking,
even staggering. Not only is interpretation by judges categorically
different than other forms of interpretation (since legal interpretations
call forth the coercive power of the state), the interpretation of legal
texts by all of us (including law students and law professors) is
categorically different because our interpretations (implicitly or
explicitly) advocate for uses of state power that are coercive, or to
use another term coined by Cover, “jurispathic.” 15
In the second sentence of the article, Cover begins to explain
the meaning of his shocking claim. “Legal interpretive acts signal

8

ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(Yale Univ. Press 1975).
9
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
10
Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L.
REV. 179 (1984-1985).
11
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-29 (1986).
12
Id. at 1601.
13
Id. n.1.
14
Id.
15
Cover, supra note 9, at 40.
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and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge
articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody
loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”16 In
making stark and explicit the connections between the
“interpretations” of judges and the “violence” the follows from those
interpretations, the seriousness and stakes of legal interpretation are
laid bare. This violence bears upon our most important interests—
liberty, property, family, life itself.
Again, on a personal note, in a way that is true of very few
sentences, I can remember precisely how reading this for the first
time made me feel: suddenly, all the clever and angry debates about
interpretation (debates in which I had been immersed as a student for
several years) seemed frivolous. Legal interpretation is different
because the stakes are different. For an English professor, a new and
iconoclastic interpretation of an important text (immediately to my
mind came Professor Fish’s brilliant and revolutionary reading of
Milton, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in “Paradise Lost”), is valued
and rewarded precisely because it is new, innovative, and
disruptive.17 Fish’s work was particularly influential because it
placed the reader, rather than the author, at the center of the
interpretive enterprise, themes he developed further in subsequent
works, such as Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of
Interpretive Communities,18 and in his collected essays, Doing What
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies (1989).19 But for a judge, or even a
lawyer, interpretation is a game played for very different stakes.
Indeed, the game is so serious that to call it a game (which, in a way
it had become for me) was to do something that was deeply immoral.
Cover’s first paragraph continues: “Interpretations in law also
constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred, or
which is about to occur.”20 This sentence brings to mind the severe

16

Cover, supra note 11, at 1601.
STANLEY FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST (Harv. Univ.
Press 2d ed.1998).
18
See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY
OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (Harv. Univ. Press 1982).
19
See generally STANLEY FISH, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric,
and the Practice of Theory, in LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (Duke Univ. Press
1990).
20
Id.; Cover, supra note 11, at 1601.
17
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consequences for fugitive slaves of judges who upheld the Fugitive
Slave Act, returning human beings into slavery, which Cover had
analyzed in Justice Accused.21 Cover’s point, however, has general
import: the violence occasioned by legal interpretation is not limited
to the immediate consequences of the Judge’s declaration, it also
implicates and perhaps validates violence that has already taken place
or that will subsequently take place as a result of the judge’s
interpretation of the law.22
Then Cover says this: “When interpreters have finished their
work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been
torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence.” 23 Cover’s
reference to “interpreters” rather than just judges again implicates all
of us who are engaged in interpreting legal texts. Words can hurt,
and in the law, this hurt is more than metaphorical, or even hurt
feelings. The judge’s words occasion violence and leave behind
victims. Cover does not let us off the hook, with some generalized
point about the coercive power of the law; he focuses our attention on
the actual people, who he identifies as victims, of the law. This is
important, for we might think of a criminal trial as involving an
accused “perpetrator” and an alleged “victim.” Cover forces us to see
that anyone—all of us—who come within the purview of the law are
potential victims of legal interpretation.
Cover continues: “Neither legal interpretation nor the
violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one
another.”24 Here Cover reminds us that we simply cannot engage in
legal interpretation without grappling with the real-world
implications—the violence—that inherently and invariably attends
legal interpretation.
Cover concludes his opening paragraph with what might
appear as an aside, but which I read as an indictment of the law and
literature, or what at the time was often casually referred to as the
“law as literature” movement. Speaking of the necessary connection
between “violence and the word” in legal interpretation, Cover says:
“This much is obvious, though the growing literature that argues for

21

COVER, supra note 8, at 175.
Cover, supra note 11, at 1601.
23
Id.
24
Id.
22
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the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores it.” 25
This sentence is accompanied by a lengthy footnote (another footnote
2) that cites several recent “Law and Literature” and “Interpretation”
symposia that resulted in two issues of important law reviews, as well
as other books, including Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire,26 and
J.B. White’s, When Words Lose Their Meaning.27 The common
denominator of these projects, Cover says, is that they place the
“meaning-giving, constructive dimension of interpretation at the heart
of law,” and advocate for the primacy of law as a “culture of
argument” that raises “rhetoric to the pinnacle of jurisprudence.” 28
I describe this as an “indictment” of the “law as literature”
movement, because Cover observes (correctly, I believe) that these
approaches focus on the “meaning-giving” dimensions of
interpretation, while underplaying or even ignoring the violence
inherent in legal interpretation. Footnote 2 continues: “The violent
side of law and its connection to interpretation and rhetoric is
systematically ignored or underplayed in the work of both Dworkin
and White.”29 When Cover states that debates about interpretation in
the law “blithely ignore” the violence and victims that follow legal
interpretation,30 he could well have been speaking of me (an
unimportant novice in the game of legal interpretation), but one
nonetheless who had thought of it mostly as a game. Thus, my
recollection of feeling that most of the arguments that took place
regarding “law as literature” were deeply frivolous.
II.
So this much is clear (at least to me): Cover forever changed
the way we should think about legal interpretation, because it is not
just a meaning generating activity, it is also a violence imposing

25

Id.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (Belknap Press 1988).
27
JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (Chicago Univ.
Press 1984).
28
Cover, supra note 11, at 1601-02 n.2.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1601.
26
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enterprise.31 But what of my assertion, in my title, that the first
paragraph of Violence and the Word “killed” the law as literature
movement?
Alas, this is certainly an overstatement. Legal interpretation
(of the sort I’ve been engaging in here) does not always occasion the
type of violence that a “killing” would entail. And so, I am engaging
in another type of literary move—metaphor—that Cover might also
condemn as “blithe” or frivolous.
Nevertheless, I do think the metaphor apropos. I do believe
Cover’s work has had a dramatic effect upon scholarly discussions of
“interpretation” in the law, and I think it is accurate to say that the
“law as literature” movement crested in the years immediately before
and after the publication of Violence and the Word and seems to have
lost momentum in the following years. An online search of the
phrase “law as literature,” shows it peaking in the years immediately
following the publication of Violence and the Word in 1986, and
dropping precipitously in subsequent years. 32 Similarly, a more
complex search of “legal interpretation” occurring in proximity to the
phrases “literary interpretation” or “literary criticism” or “literary
theory” also shows a spike in the years immediately after the
publication of Violence and the Word, which then trails off
significantly in the following years.33 In contrast, more generic
31

Various writers have cited Cover for his significance as an early critic of the law
as literature movement. See e.g., John Tasiouias, The Paradox of Equity, 55
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456 (1996) (citing Cover for the proposition that the “analogy
between literary and legal judgment appears to be subject to certain drastic
limitations”).
32
For example, a search in the Law Journal Library in HeinOnline with the
following parameters: Advanced Search; Sections: Articles, Comments, Notes,
Reviews, Legislation, Cases, Decisions, Miscellaneous, Index, Editorial and
External Articles; Dates: Starting 1980; and Text search: “law as literature,” shows
that the frequency of the phrase “law as literature” peaked in the years following
the publication of Violence and the Word and has been in decline in the years since:
1980-1986 = 122
1987-1993 = 288
1994-2000 = 196
2001-2007 = 165
2008-2014 = 157
2015-2021 = 89
33
The search parameters in, id. at Text Search: “legal interpretation” AND
(“literary interpretation” OR “literary criticism” OR “literary theory”), revealed the
frequency of the phrase’s use:
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references to “law and literature” have continued to increase since the
1980s.34 But it is difficult to conclude too much (least of all
causation) from this kind of word frequency analysis.35
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say Cover’s argument
abruptly changed the way I think about interpretation, and in
particular about the value and applicability of the insights and
techniques of literary interpretation for the interpretation of legal
texts, and that it should have—and to a remarkable extent seems to
have had—a similar effect on the way all of us think about legal
interpretation.
III.
It is noteworthy that in the years since the publication of
Violence and the Word, the center of gravity of statutory and even
constitutional interpretation moved away from an obsession with
“intent” versus the role of readers and “interpretive communities” to
debates that center mostly upon “text” and the ordinary and
reasonable meaning of texts. 36 The emphasis on text, rather than the
1980-1986 = 83
1987-1993 = 272
1994-2000 = 204
2001-2007 = 119
2008-2014 = 135
2015-2021 = 91
34
The search parameters in, id. at Text Search: “Law and Literature,” revealed a
somewhat different pattern, with references to law and literature increasing over
time, with an apparent dip in the last six years:
1980-1986 = 407
1987-1993 = 1429
1994-2000 = 1767
2001-2007 = 1730
2008-2014 = 1727
2015-2021 = 1428
35
This type of search pulls all mentions of a phrase and does not tell us whether it
is an important part of the analysis, so it will involve both over and under counting.
Also, the number of articles over time has increased dramatically, so raw numbers
likely do not tell the full story.
36
The gravitational force of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia is perhaps
the key to this switch. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, THE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR HUMAN VALUES
(Princeton Univ. Press 1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (West Group 2012); ANTHONY
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consensus of “interpretive communities” recognizes the force and
authority of law in a way that other theories underplay. There is
something far more sober about debates about debates regarding the
“ordinary meaning” of texts, than the open-textured possibilities of
interpretation inspired by literary theory. It is noteworthy that, in
2015, Justice Elena Kagan famously declared: “We’re all textualists
now!” in a conversation at Harvard Law School honoring Justice
Antonin Scalia.37 As others have noted, Justice Kagan’s statement
was more than a truism, but was rather a “testament to the sea change
the law has undergone in recent decades.” 38 Justice Kagan explained
that when she was in law school (she graduated in 1986, the year
Violence and the Word was published), if someone had mentioned
“statutory interpretation” to her, she was not sure she “would even
quite have known what that meant,” since statutory interpretation
“was not really taught as a discipline.” 39 The approach to statutory
interpretation at that time, Justice Kagan explained, was “what should
this statute be,” rather than what do “the words on the paper say?” 40
Focusing on what a statute should be drinks deeply from the well of
literary approaches to interpretation, and as Justice Kagan notes, can
turn judges into legislators. 41 Focusing on the words of a statutory
text is a much more deferential and modest mindset for a judge to
adopt, one that is consonant with the stakes—the violence and the
victims—that attend legal interpretation.

SCALIA, THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA: ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW (Jeffrey S. Sutton & Edward Whelan eds., 2020).
37
Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes (Nov. 25, 2015).
38
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304 (2017).
39
Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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